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DETERRENCE, BRUTALIZATION, AND THE
DEATH PENALTY: ANOTHER
EXAMINATION OF OKLAHOMA'S
RETURN TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
WILLIAM C. BAILEY
Cleveland State University
A replication and extension of a weekly ARIMA analysis (1989
1991) by Cochran et al. (1994), which appeared in Criminology, con
firms that Oklahoma's return to capital punishment in 1990, after a 25
year moratorium, was followed by a significant increase in killings
involving strangers. Moreover, a multivariate autoregressive analysis,
which includes measures of the frequency of executions, the level of
print media attention devoted to executions, and selected soci
odemographic variables, produced results consistent with the brutaliza
tion hypothesis for total homicides, as well as a variety of different
types of killing involving both strangers and nonstrangers. No prior
study has shown such strong support for the capital punishment and
brutalization argument. However, there is also a suggestion of a possi
ble lagged deterrent effect for the level of media coverage of executions
for nonfelony murders involving strangers. The analysis indicates that
the impact of capital punishment in Oklahoma during the 1989-1991
period was much more extensive than suggested by the earlier study.
Recommendations are made for further research examining additional
jurisdictions and time periods to determine the generalizability of the
patterns found for Oklahoma.

In an article that appeared in Criminology, Cochran et al. (1994) pro
vide an important contribution to a long line of research examining the
effect of capital punishment on murder. They point out that with few
exceptions (Bowers and Pierce, 1980; Ehrlich, 1975, 1977; King, 1978; Phil
lips, 1980; Stack, 1987), death penalty investigators have found no consis
tent evidence that capital punishment is associated with either lower
(deterrence) or higher (brutalization) homicide rates. Rather, the over
whelming pattern is support for the null hypothesis that capital punish
ment neither discourages nor encourages murd'er.
Despite this evidence, Cochran et al. argue that both deterrence and
brutalization might be operating to some degree for different types of
murder. However, because most researchers examine the overall homi
cide rate, this important variation is masked. That is, if capital punishment
discourages some types of homicide but encourages other types, it is not
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surprising that most studies find essentially a "zero" relationship between
capital punishment ap.d the general homicide rate.
Deterrence investigators are not unaware of the need to examine death
eligible homicides. To the contrary, they long have recognized the impor
tance of doing so, but have been hampered by the inability to disaggregate
official homicide data. Several studies have overcome this obstacle and
have examined some types of capital killings: premeditated murder and
felony murder (Bailey, 1975, 1984; Dann, 1935; Peterson and Bailey, 1991;
Savitz, 1958). Still, like general homicide studies, these efforts have pro
vided no indication of deterrence.
Researchers examining the brutalization argument (Bowers, 1988; King,
1978) have not given systematic attention to which types of murder might
be more or less encouraged by capital punishment. For example, Bowers
and Pierce (1980:456) contend that executions devalue human life and
legitimate lethal vengeance, but they do not indicate how brutalization
operates for homicides occurring under different circumstances. In light of
the limited understanding of whether brutalization/deterrence applies for
different types of killing, the Cochran et al. article makes an important
contribution by examining the influence of executions for different types
of killing.
More specifically, Cochran et al. posit that killings involving strangers
may be incited by capital punishment. They contend that, in general, if
inhibitions against the use of lethal violence to solve problems created by
"unworthy" others are reduced by executions, "such a brutalization effect
is most likely to occur in 'situated transactions' ... where inhibitions
against the use of violence are already absent or considerably relaxed"
(1994:110). Affronts by strangers involve such a context due to the fact
that social ties, and hence social controls, are much weaker for persons not
known to one another. Cochran et al. confirm empirically that for one
jurisdiction, Oklahoma for 1989-1991, a return to capital punishment after
a 25-year moratorium on executions was followed by an immediate and
permanent increase in killings among strangers. A weekly time-series
ARIMA analysis showed that the execution of Charles Troy Coleman on
September 10, 1990, was followed by a significant increase in overall stran
ger killings. However, not all types of homicide involving strangers
increased significantly following the Coleman execution. Rather, signifi
cant increases were observed only for nonfelony and argument-related
stranger killings. Felony-murders and robbery-related killings involving
strangers did not increase significantly following the imposition of the
death penalty on Coleman. Weekly killings neither increased nor
decreased significantly for (1) total murders, (2) total felony murders, (3)
total robbery-related killings, and (4) total death-eligible murders.
Cochran et al. regard their findings as preliminary, and they call for further
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research "to explicate the links between the implementation of the death
penalty and changes in the levels of both total and disaggregated measures
of stranger homicides" (p. 130). This article provides further evidence on
this important issue.
The analysis presented below extends the Cochran et al. study of
Oklahoma homicides by (1) considering important death penalty variables
not considered in the earlier analysis-the levels of execution and media
coverage devoted to executions during the 1989-1991 period; (2) examin
ing the immediate (within the week) and possible delayed deterrentlbru
talization effects of the death penalty for the different types of murder;
and (3) incorporating the execution and selected sociodemographic vari
ables into a multivariate time-series regression analysis. This is done to
avoid possible spurious results suggesting deterrent or brutalization effects
for the Coleman intervention factor and the execution publicity variables
that might be due to changes in demographic or economic conditions in
Oklahoma during the period.
Cochran et al. have facilitated greatly this analysis by providing both the
homicide file that they received from the Supplementary Homicide
Reports (SHR) of the Oklahoma Uniform Crime Reports, and their weekly
code sheets for different types of killing. With these two sources, I have
been able to (1) replicate the Cochran et al. analysis for the types of homi
cide they examined, (2) extend their analysis by considering the impact of
levels of execution and publicity for various types of stranger and non
stranger killings, and (3) examine the merits of ARIMA modeling versus
multivariate autoregressive techniques for isolating the effect of capital
punishment.

METHODOLOGY
Initially, I employed the same general methodology as Cochran and his
colleagues. Using their code sheets and "raw" SHR homicide incident
data, weekly time series were formed for the 1989-1991 period (n = 156
weeks) for the types of murder examined earlier: (1) total killings, (2) total
felony murders, (3) total robbery-related killings, (4) total death-eligible
murders, (5) total killings involving strangers, (6) felony murders not
involving strangers, (7) stranger robbery-related killings, (8) stranger
nonfelony related murders, and (9) argument-related killings involving
strangers. In addition, weekly time series were formed for (10) total non
stranger killings and (11) robbery-related killings not involving strangers.
Cochran et al. did not consider these two related categories.
For the Cochran et al. analysis, the dependent variables were operation
alized as the number of weekly homicide incidents. However, homicide
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victimization is the criterion variable typically used by death penalty inves
tigators. Cochran et al. do not discuss why they chose to examine homi
cide incidents rather than victim counts. Initially, I viewed Cochran et al.'s
choice to use homicide incidents, rather than victimizations, as the depen
dent variable as unfortunate because it would make it more difficult to
compare their findings with those of previous death penalty analyses.
Because some killings involve multiple victims, there are obviously more
homicide victimizations than homicide incidents, but Cochran et al. do not
discuss the ratio of the two.
Examination of the SHR data for Oklahoma for the 1989-1991 period
shows that Cochran and his colleagues' decision to consider homicide inci
dents as the criterion variable does not pose a problem. Over the period,
the data reveal a total of 690 homicide victims and 672 homicide incidents.
That is, for the period most Oklahoma homicide incidents involved but a
single victim (ratio: 690/672 = 1.07). Further, for the types of killings
noted above, the correlation between weekly homicide incidents and vic
tim counts ranges from .87 to 1.00. Thus, the two time-series measure
essentially the same thing.1 In light of this comparability, incident-based
homicide measures are used in replicating and extending the Cochran et
al. analysis. 2

THE COLEMAN EXECUTION: THE INTERVENTION VARIABLE
Charles Troy Coleman was executed in Oklahoma on September 10,
1990. Cochran et al. treated the 88 weeks leading up to the execution as a
pre-intervention period and the week of the execution through the end of
December 1991 (n = 68) as an intervention period. However, because of
the amount of pUblicity the week before the execution, they also consid
ered an alternative variable that differentiated weeks 1-87 from weeks
1. For the types of homicide considered, the respective correlations are as follows
for the incident- and victim-based measures: total killings (.98); capital homicides (.93);
total felony murders (.92); felony murders involving strangers (.91); felony murders not
involving strangers (.97); total robbery-related killings (.87); robbery-related murders
involving strangers (.90); robbery murders not involving strangers (.90); total killings
involving strangers (.96); nonfelony murders involving strangers (.95); argument-related
killings involving strangers (1.00), and total nonstranger killings (.98).
2. A reviewer of an earlier version of this article recommended using weekly
offender counts, broken down by race of offender, as an additional dependent variable.
The rationale provided for this recommendation was that whites and blacks may be
differentially subject to deterrence, with blacks being less deterrable because they have
a lower stake in conformity. Such an analysis was not conducted here due to the sizable
proportion of homicide incidents in which (1) the number of homicide offenders
involved is unknown or not reported by the Oklahoma authorities and (2) the race of
the involved offender is unknown or not reported in the homicide data file.
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88-156. As one would predict, the results for the two intervention vari
ables were the same because the Oil coding for the pre- and intervention
weeks only differs for one observation (r = .987). Here, I rely on the for
mer measure, treating the intervention period as beginning the week Cole
man was put to death (week 89).

EXECUTION PUBLICITY
Cochran et al. view the Coleman execution as providing a natural quasi
experiment because of the considerable media attention that it received in
Oklahoma. This may be the case, but it is important to note that the
researchers did not examine the actual impact of media coverage of execu
tions on weekly homicides. During the 1989-1991 period, citizens of
Oklahoma were exposed not only to media coverage of the Coleman exe
cution, which took place in their own state, but also to coverage of execu
tions that took place in other jurisdictions. It is possible that media
coverage in Oklahoma of executions that took place in other states could
have a significant deterrentlbrutalization effect for Oklahoma killings. If
executions signal to citizens that it is right and proper to kill bad persons,
the possible brutalization effect of capital punishment that results for
Oklahoma citizens might not be restricted solely to executions that take
place within the state of Oklahoma. Conversely, if executions signal to the
public the negative consequences that can result from taking another per
son's life (deterrence), as well as validating the norm against killing (nor
mative validation), the general preventive effects (Andenaes, 1974) of
executions that take place in other jurisdictions might spill over to discour
age killings in Oklahoma. I explore these possibilities in the analysis to
follow.
Unfortunately, there is no systematic index, abstract, or other summary
data available for Oklahoma's daily newspapers (n = 28), television sta
tions (n = 26), or radio stations (over 200) that can be drawn upon to
measure the amount of news coverage devoted to executions during the
1989-1991 period. This problem is not unique to Oklahoma; rather it has
plagued other time-series analyses of execution publicity and state-level
homicide patterns (King, 1978; Stack, 1990, 1993). A common practice has
been to operationalize the amount of media attention devoted to execu
tions as the level of coverage provided by the "newspaper of record" for a
state, such as the South Carolina State for South Carolina (King, 1978) and
The Atlanta Constitution for Georgia (Stack, 1993). Following this prac
tice, I draw upon execution coverage that appeared in The Daily
Oklahoman during the 1989-1991 period. The "Oklahoman" is the paper
of record for the state, and has the largest circulation of the daily newspa
pers in Oklahoma.
During the three-year period there was a total of 53 executions in the
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United States. Of these, 33 received coverage in the Oklahoman, and cov
erage appeared during 30 of the 156 weeks in the time period. Drawing
upon these data, a media variable was formed by summing the number of
days of execution coverage per week (range, 0 to 5).
Linking execution coverage and homicides is somewhat problematic in a
weekly time-series analysis. For example, the question arises whether
levels should be tallied for the week that execution stories actually appear,
or for a portion of the story week and the week to follow. To elaborate, if
deterrence and/or brutalization is operative, it is reasonable to expect that
an execution story that appears during the first few days of the week
would be associated with a significant decline/increase in killings for that
week. In contrast, the impact of media coverage of an execution that
occurred during the last few days of the week (week t) might not be real
ized fully until the next (t+1) week. The research reported below uses a
measure of newspaper coverage of executions whereby stories that
appeared during the first part of the week are considered as taking place
during week t, and coverage that took place during the latter part of the
week (during day 6 or 7) is considered as taking place during the next
(t+1) week.3
OTHER EXECUTIONS
As discussed above, 33 of the 53 executions that took place in the
United States between 1989 and 1991 received one or more days of media
coverage in the Oklahoman. The deterrence thesis predicts that, in gen
eral, homicides should be at a lower level for the weeks in which execu
tions received coverage in the Oklahoman. The brutalization thesis
predicts higher levels of killing for weeks with media coverage. However,
it cannot be assumed that the 20 executions that did not receive coverage
in the Oklahoman did not come to the attention of Oklahoma residents
via alternative media sources, including other Oklahoma newspapers, out
of-state papers, radio, television news, and the like. As noted, there are a
number of other daily newspapers in the state, as well as television and
radio stations. Thus, it is possible that a portion of Oklahoma residents
learned of at least some of the 20 executions that did not receive coverage
in the Oklahoman from other newspapers and electronic media, especially
from neighboring states. Of note, during the 1989-1991 period executions
took place in neighboring Texas (n = 13), Missouri (n = 6), and Arkansas
(n = 2).
3. I also explored a media variable operationalized as the number of "story days"
tallied according to the actual week of coverage, but the former variable was used here
because it yielded more consistent results.
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Unfortunately, there is no way of knowing how many Oklahoma resi
dents (1) learned from other media sources about the 33 executions that
did receive coverage in the Oklahoman and (2) learned from other media
sources about the 20 executions that were not covered by the state's paper
of record. However, it is quite likely that some of the executions that did
receive coverage in the Oklahoman also were carried by other sources,
and that some of the executions that did not appear in the Oklahoman did
receive attention by other media sources. For example, a spot check
shows that one of the executions that did not receive coverage in the
Oklahoman did receive coverage in the state's second largest daily news
paper-the Tulsa World, and another received coverage in a Dallas, Texas,
daily newspaper that has considerable readership in southern Oklahoma.
In sum, the possibility cannot be ruled out that during the 1989-1991
period, at least some portions of the Oklahoma population were exposed
to media coverage of executions from sources other than the Oklahoman.
However, for all practical purposes, Oklahoma residents were not exposed
to media coverage of executions for the weeks when no executions were
conducted. Here, the only exception would be lingering coverage of an
execution(s) that took place the previous weekes).
To take into consideration the fact that executions that did receive cov
erage in the Oklahoman also may have received coverage from other
sources in the state, and that at least some of the executions that did not
receive coverage in the Oklahoman did receive alternative media coverage
in the state, I introduce the number of weekly executions as an additional
death penalty variable in the multivariate analysis. The reasoning here is
that the greater the number of weekly executions, the greater the
probability of Oklahoma residents being exposed to media coverage of
executions. I recognize that apart from weeks in which there were no
executions, there was certainly not a one-to-one relationship between the
number of weekly executions and the number of executions that were
brought to the attention of Oklahoma citizens via the media. However, in
the analysis to follow, it does not make sense to treat an execution-free
week like a week with one or more executions simply because the execu
tion(s) did not receive coverage in the Oklahoman.
During the 1989-1991 period weekly execution counts ranged from zero
to three. As with the Oklahoman media coverage variable, a measure of
the frequency of capital punishment is used whereby executions that took
place during the first part of the week are considered as taking place dur
ing week t, and executions that took place during the latter part of the
week (during day 6 or 7) are considered as taking place during the next
(H1) week. 4
4. This measure is chosen over one that examines executions occurring during the
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THE TIMING BETWEEN EXECUTIONS, EXECUTION
PUBLICITY, AND HOMICIDES
Time-series analyses of capital punishment have often considered the
possibility that executions (and execution publicity) may have both imme
diate and lingering effects on homicides. For example, for a weekly time
series analysis, the major deterrent/brutalization impact of the death pen
alty might be experienced during the execution week (week t), with effects
diminishing during the weeks to follow (weeks HI, t+2 ... ). Or, it is
possible that the major deterrent/brutalization impact of capital punish
ment is delayed by a week or two rather than immediate. A third possibil
ity is that the deterrent effect of executions may be more immediate, while
brutalization effects are delayed, or vice versa. To consider these possibili
ties, in the multivariate analyses that follow homicide counts for week tare
regressed against the execution frequency and the media variables for
week t, t-l, t-2, and t-3 simultaneously. As the findings reported in the
tables to follow make clear, both immediate and delayed execution effects
are observed for some types of murder. Lagged execution variables for
week t-4 and beyond were also explored, but without significant results.
CONTROL VARIABLES
To isolate the effect of the Coleman execution on homicides, Cochran et
al. used ARIMA modeling to control for trend, drift, and autocorrelation.
However, ARIMA modeling cannot (1) control specifically for third-vari
able sociodemographic factors known to be associated with homicide or
(2) isolate the effect of multiple independent variables of interest, such as
levels of execution and the amount of news coverage that executions
receive. Rather, conventional ARIMA modeling generally is capable of
assessing the impact of only a single intervention factor in a time series.
Because the deterrence doctrine poses multiple dimensions of capital pun
ishment as influencing offense behavior, and homicides are responsive to a
number of important structural factors, only rarely (McFarland, 1983)
have death penalty investigators used ARIMA techniques. s In this study,
actual execution week because it produces results that are more in line with theoretical
expectations.
5. A reviewer of an earlier version of this article suggested that my concerns
about the merits of ARIMA modeling for the Cochran et al. analysis are overstated
because by whitening the data series for the different types of murder, Cochran et al.
were able to control for the influence of executions, media coverage of executions, and
sociodemographic factors. I disagree with the reviewer. First, by employing conven
tional ARIMA strategies, it is possible to more or less "whiten" a series such as the
Oklahoma homicide data. When successful, various trend and noise factors are "con
trolled," but whitening is often somewhat problematic. Of greater concern, theoreti
cally important noise factors were whitened in the Cochran et al. ARIMA analysis,
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I conduct a multivariate time-series analysis of Oklahoma homicides. By
doing so, I can examine the influence of a variety of capital punishment
factors, including the Coleman execution, and assess how well the model
ing strategy used by Cochran et al. addresses brutalization/deterrence
hypotheses.
Common structural control variables used in previous death penalty
studies include (1) population size, (2) percent urban population, (3) per
cent population 15-34 years of age, (4) percent black population, (5) per
cent poverty, low income, or families on public assistance, and (6) the
unemployment rate. During the relatively short period involved
(1989-1991), Oklahoma did not change dramatically with respect to
percents urban and black population. However, for the remaining vari
ables there was sufficient change to possibly affect homicides. Thus, this
analysis includes the following control factors: (1) population size (range =
3.146 to 3.208 million), (2) percent popUlation 15-34 years of age (range,
30% to 33%), (3) percent population receiving AFDC benefits (range, 3%
to 4%), and (4) percent unemployment (range, 5% to 7%).6
As additional controls, monthly dummy variables for each type of homi
cide were included if the number of such killings was significantly higher

including levels of execution and the media coverage they received. But why treat
executions and execution publicity as simply noise to be removed from the data series?
Levels of execution and the amount of publicity they receive (along with the Cole
man intervention) are of fundamental theoretical importance to deterrence and brutali
zation arguments. For this reason, I view conventional multivariate autoregressive
procedures as far more informative than standard single intervention ARIMA model
ing in considering deterrencelbrutalization questions for Oklahoma. Why be satisfied
with a single Coleman execution intervention estimate with ARIMA when conven
tional multivariate autoregressive procedures also (1) provide an estimate for the effect
of the Coleman intervention, (2) provide estimates for the impact of executions and
execution publicity, as well as (3) provide estimates for how changing sociodemographic
conditions over the 1989-1991 period may have influenced Oklahoma killings. The
fundamental weakness of conventional ARIMA modeling for this type of study clearly
is demonstrated by my findings for the frequency of executions and execution publicity
variables.
6. Unfortunately, weekly figures were not available for the control variables for
the 1989-1991 period. Rather, only monthly figures were available for the unemploy
ment rate and AFDC factors; and only annual data were available for population size
and percent population 15-34 years of age. In the multivariate analyses (Tables 2-6),
month figures are used for the control variables. For the two population variables,
monthly estimates were formed through linear interpolation. I do not view the use of
monthly (rather than weekly) values for the control variables as a serious problem since
my interest is not in directly estimating the impact of these structural factors on homi
cides. Rather, the control variables are included in the analysis to take into account
general shifts in important sociodemographic conditions over the 1989-1991 period.
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or lower for a given month compared to other months. 7 This method of
controlling for months in which levels of homicide are atypically higher or
lower than average is preferable to the practice of forming 12 distinct
dummy variables and including 11 of the 12 monthly dummies in a regres
sion analysis. While some death penalty researchers have done so, this
procedure is not followed here because it treats each monthly dummy
variable as if it makes a unique contribution to homicides, a pattern that to
my knowledge never has been observed. Further, such a procedure need
lessly sacrifices degrees of freedom in the analysis.
MULTICOLLINEARITY
To explore possible collinearity problems for the variables of interest, a
series of auxiliary regressions were conducted in which each death penalty
factor was regressed against the control and other execution variables.
When the number of weekly executions was regressed against the controls,
the Coleman execution intervention dummy (0/1) variable, and the execu
tion publicity variable, the resulting R2 value was .39. When the media
coverage variable was treated as dependent, the resulting R2 value was 040.
And, when the Coleman intervention variable was treated as the criterion
variable, the R2 value was .75.
The size of the R2 value (.75) for the Coleman intervention variable
indicates that this factor is associated strongly with some of the other
predictors: percent 15-34 years of age (r = -.77), level of unemployment (r
= .53) and percent AFDC population (r = .83). Because of these associa
tions, it is important to consider the impact of the Coleman execution in a
multivariate context. It is easy to imagine how Oklahoma's homicide pat
terns may have shifted over the 1989-1991 period due to changes in soci
odemographic conditions, and these shifts seem to correspond with the
pre- and Coleman-execution periods. However, to assume that the Cole
man execution caused changes in sociodemographic conditions in
Oklahoma obviously is not reasonable.
In contrast, the auxiliary regression analysis does not signal obvious col
linearity problems for the execution frequency (R2 = .39) and execution
publicity (R2 = 040) variables. However, the number of executions per
week and the number of days of newspaper coverage of executions per
week are correlated at a moderate level (r = .615) for the 1989-1991 time
7. For total killings, capital homicides, stranger nonfelony murders, and non
stranger killings, counts were not significantly higher or lower than average for any of
the 12 months. For total felony murders, incident counts were significantly below aver
age for November; homicide frequencies were significantly higher than average for Jan
uary for felony murders not involving strangers, total robbery-related murders, and
robbery murders not involving strangers. For total killings involving strangers, counts
were significantly above the monthly average for September.
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series. The relationship between these two death penalty variables has
been raised as a matter of concern by a reviewer of an earlier version of
this article. There is, of course, an asymmetrical dependence between the
frequency of executions and media coverage of executions. Without the
occurrence of an execution, there can be no media coverage. However,
not all of the 53 executions in the United States during the period received
coverage by the Oklahoman (33/53 = 62%). Because of the overlap
between these two variables (n = 33), the reviewer recommended that I
first estimate the multivariate models including both the frequency of
executions and amount of media coverage and, second, exclude the fre
quency of execution variable from the analysis. I do so in the analysis to
follow in examining the dependency between the two execution variables.
Alternatively, the regression models also are estimated including the fre
quency of execution variables and excluding the media coverage variables.

FINDINGS
The first step in the analysis was to "enter and proof" the data for the
different types of homicide. Since Cochran et al. provided their data code
sheets, I had no difficulty replicating the univariate patterns reported in
the earlier study. Because the earlier findings are confirmed, results of
this analysis are not reported in tabular or graphic form.
BIVARIATE RESULTS
The second step was to compare the average number of weekly killings
before and after the Coleman execution for the different types of murder.
Table 1 reports the mean number of homicides for the pre- (n = 88) and
Coleman-execution (n = 68) weeks for each type of murder for the
1989-1991 period. Of the 12 offense categories, average weekly homicides
increased for (1) total killings, (2) felony murders involving strangers, (3)
total robbery-related killings, (4) robbery-related killings involving stran
gers, (5) total stranger killings, (6) stranger argument-related killings, and
(7) stranger nonfelony killings. The increases were significant for total
stranger killings, stranger argument-related killings, and stranger
nonfelony killings. These results are consistent with Cochran et al.'s
report of a "brutalization" pattern for these three offense categories.
In contrast, the average number of weekly (1) capital homicides, (2)
total felony murders, (3) nonstranger felony murders, (4) robbery-related
murders not involving strangers, and (5) nonstranger killings declined fol
lowing the Coleman execution. However, none of these decreases was sta
tistically significant.
In short, as Cochran et al. found, the before-after analysis is suggestive
of a brutalization effect for the Coleman execution for some, but not
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Table l.

Summary of Weekly Homicide Incidents for
Oklahoma, by Type of Killing for
Pre-Coleman and Coleman Execution
Periods, 1989-1991

Victim
1Ype of Homicide
Group*
All Killings
T
Capital Homicides
T
Felony Murders
T
Felony Murders
ST
Felony Murders
NS
Robbery-Related
T
Killings
Robbery-Related
ST
Killings
NS
Robbery-Related
Killings
Stranger Killings
ST
Stranger ArgumentST
Related Killings
Stranger Nonfelony
ST
Killings
Nonstranger Killings
NS
* T = total, ST = strangers, NS
** p < .05.

Pre-Coleman
Execution
Period
Mean
N
4.20
370
48
.55
64
.73
19
.22
.34
30
29
.33

Coleman
Execution
Period
N
Mean
302
4.44
34
.50
44
.65
24
.35
15
.22
30
.44

tValues
-.659
.363
.602
-1.485
1.342
-1.071

12

.14

18

.26

-1.566

17

.19

12

.18

.229

37
4

.42
.05

53
12

.78
.18

-2.617**
-2.351**

18

.20

29

.43

-2.270**

263

2.99

200

2.94

.157

= nonstrangers.

other, types of stranger homicide. Of particular note, the brutalization
effect of the Coleman execution appears to be confined to nonfelony,
argument-related killings. The average number of felony murders (.22 vs.
.35) involving strangers increased considerably following the Coleman
execution, but not significantly (at the .05 level). There is no evidence of a
significant deterrent effect resulting from the Coleman execution. The inci
dent of felony murders not involving strangers (.34 vs..22) declined notice
ably, but not significantly, after this execution. The question of whether
these bivariate patterns will continue to hold when additional execution
and control factors are considered is addressed below.
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
As a first step in the multivariate analysis, the autoregressive structure
was examined for each type of murder for lag periods ranging through t-20
weeks. The SAS (statistical analysis system) autoregressive procedure
(SAS Institute, 1985) was used to identify, and where necessary, to fit
autoregressive models. In the regression analysis to follow, Yule-Walker
estimates are reported where significant autocorrelation was observed.
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Ordinary least squares estimates are presented where there is not signifi
cant autocorrelation.
To reiterate, in general, the deterrence doctrine leads one to expect a
significant inverse relationship between homicides and the Coleman inter
vention, levels of execution, and the amount of media coverage of execu
tions, net of the control factors. Conversely, the brutalization argument
predicts that death penalty factors should be associated positively with
homicides when other variables are controlled. These predictions are con
sidered in Tables 2-6. Table 2 reports the results for total killings, capital
murders, homicides associated with other felonies, and robbery-related
killings.8
Contrary to the deterrence perspective, there is no indication that the
Coleman execution was followed by a significant decrease in weekly kill
ings for any of the four homicide categories. Only for capital murders was
there a noticeable decline in killings following the Coleman execution (b =
-.348, s.e. = .225, t = -1.55), but the reduction fell short of achieving statis
tical significance at the conventional .05 level (t = 1.66 or higher). There
also is no indication that levels of execution or the days of news coverage
of executions in the United States produced a significant deterrent effect
on homicides.
In contrast, there is a suggestion of brutalization in Table 2, but it stems
from execution publicity rather than from the Coleman intervention or the
number of executions. Neither of the latter two variables resulted in a
significant increase in any of the four types of homicide. By contrast, for
three of the four types of killing, one or another of the media variables is
associated with a significant increase in homicides. The total number of
Oklahoma killings increased significantly (b = .751, s.e. = .367, t = 2.05)
during weeks t when there was newspaper coverage of executions. In the
case of capital homicides, the coefficient for media coverage of executions
during week t falls short of statistical significance (t = 1.60 vs. t = 1.66), but
the level of media attention given to executions for week t-2 is associated
positively, and significantly, with these killings (b = .230, s.e. = .129, t =
1.78). For robbery-related killings, the amount of media coverage of
executions during the execution week is associated significantly, and posi
tively, with this type of murder (b = .185, s.e. = .108, t = 1.71). None of the
media variables is associated significantly with total felony murder.
In sum, Table 2 gives a clear suggestion that the overall level of murder,
capital homicides, and robbery-related killings was encouraged, and not
discouraged, in Oklahoma by media coverage of executions. I next
8. For reasons of parsimony, the results of the high/low monthly dummy variables
are not reported in tabular form (Tables 2-6).
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Table 2. Summary of Regression Results for Total
Homicides, Capital Homicides, Total Felony
Murders, and Total Robbery-Related
Killings
All Killings
Predictor Variables
Population
% Age 15-34 Years
Unemployment Rate
% AFDC Population
Coleman Intervention
No. of Executions
Week I
Week 1-1
Week 1-2
Week 1-3
No. of Days of
Newspaper Coverage
WeekI
Week 1-1
Week 1-2
Week 1-3
R'Value

Capital Homicides

Total Felony
Murders

Total RobberyRelated Killings

b

S.E.

b

S.E.

b

S.E.

b

S.E.

-.005
.126
-.167
1.981
-.231

.017
.572
.299
2.312
.633

-.010
.056
.181
.746
-.348

.006
.202
.107"
.811
.225

-.012
.188
.063
1.062
-.178

.008
.248
.139
.976
.281

-.009
.168
.101
.527
.152

.006
.181
.119
.721
.205

-.267
.055
.073
-.145

.385
.389
.401
.394

.116
-.189
-.064
-.021

.134
.137
.141
.137

.065
-.124
-.043
-.013

.149
.156
.159
.153

.065
-.181
-.106
-.088

.113
.119
.122
.117

.751
.215
.274
-.320
.120

.367'
.364
.369
.352

.205
.172
.230
-.004
.161

.128
.127
.129'
.122

.205
.123
.139

.143
.144
.145
.135

.185
.135
.143
.079
.109

.108"
.109
.109
.101

-.044
.110

• P < .05.

examine whether this apparent brutalization effect is a function of stranger
killings that are included in these three offense categories.
KILLINGS INVOLVING STRANGERS
Table 3 reports the regression results for four categories of homicide
involving parties not known to one another: (1) all killings involving stran
gers, (2) felony murders involving strangers, (3) nonfelony murders involv
ing strangers, and (4) robbery-related killings involving strangers. 9 The
results of this analysis are mixed for the deterrence and brutalization
hypotheses. First, consistent with the results reported by Cochran et aI.,
the Coleman execution was followed by a significant increase in overall
stranger and nonfelony stranger killings, but not felony murder or rob
bery-homicide involving strangers. These more utilitarian types of stran
ger murder did increase following the Coleman execution, but not
significantly.
Second, there is no indication that the volume of weekly or lagged
executions caused a significant increase or decrease in the levels of total,
9. The offense category "argument-related killings involving strangers" (n = 16) is
excluded from the multivariate analysis reported in Table 3. Their very small number (4
during the pre-Coleman execution period and 12 following the Coleman execution)
does not permit a reliable analysis.
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Table 3. Summary of Regression Results for Homicides
Involving Strangers
All Stranger
Killings
Predictor Variables
Population
% Age 15-34 Years
Unemployment Rate
% AFDC Population
Coleman Intervention
No. of Executions
Week t
Week t-1
Week t-2
Week t-3
No. of Days of
Newspaper Coverage
Week t
Week t-1
Week t-2
Week t-3
R'Value

Stranger Felony
Murders

Stranger
Nonfelony
Killings

Stranger
Robbery-Related
Killings

b

S.E.

b

S.E.

b

S.E.

b

S.E.

-.009

-.007
.161
.005
.671
.131

.005
.158
.088
.630
.190

-.002
.042
-.084
-.195
.523

.006
.174
.102
.645
.220·

-.003
.090
.038
.199
.186

.004

.229
-.036
.652
.561

.008
.255
.145
.991
.317·

-.088
-.204
-.031
-.041

.150
.157
.160
.152

-.032
-.224
-.194
-.104

.094
.104·
.106·
.102

-.057
.005
.158
.060

.098
.103
.105
.100

-.001
-.136
-.106
-.016

.087
.091
.093
.089

.263

.141·
.143
.145·
.135

.110
.172
.200
.070
.119

.094
.095·
.096·
.090

.174
-.173
.137
.020
.177

.093·
.094·
.095
.089

.130
.119
.135
-.015
.121

.082
.083
.084
.079

.004
.320
.077
.166

.139
.077
.552
.167

• p < .05.

nonfelony, or robbery-related stranger murders. However, for felony
murders involving strangers, the level of killing is associated negatively
and significantly with the frequency of executions for week t-1 (b = -.224,
s.e. = .104, t = -2.15) and week t-2 (b = -.194), s.e. = .106, t = -1.83). Thus,
there is an indication that the volume of executions may have had a
delayed deterrent effect on stranger felony murder.
Thrning to the media variables, total stranger killings were significantly
higher (b = .263, s.e. = .141, t = 1.86) for weeks in which executions
received coverage in the Oklahoman and for week t-2 coverage (b = .320,
s.e. = .145, t = 2.21). Similarly, for felony murders involving strangers, the
positive media coefficients are significant for week t-1 (b = .172, s.e. = .095,
t = 1.81) and week t-2 (b = .200, s.e. = .096, t = 2.08). However, for stran
ger nonfelony killings, there is a suggestion of brutalization for media cov
erage of executions during week t, but an apparent deterrent effect for
levels of execution during week t-1.
In sum, there are suggestions of both brutalization and deterrence in
Table 3. However, no simple explanation of the mixed pattern is possible.
The same type of stranger murder (e.g., stranger felony and stranger
nonfelony killings) appears to be encouraged by some aspects of capital
punishment, but discouraged by others. For example, the number of
executions seems to discourage stranger felony killings while media cover
age appears to promote this type of homicide. Also puzzling, the media
variables show conflicting patterns regarding nonfelony stranger murder.
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For reasons that are not obvious, there is a suggestion that the immediate
effect (during week t) of media coverage of executions is to promote
nonfelony stranger killings, but the impact turns in the opposite direction
toward deterrence for the week t-1 media variable for these type of kill
ings. Of interest, the positive week t (b = .174) and negative week t-1 (b =
-.173) media coefficients are nearly identical in size and essentially cancel
one another out for a net result of .001.
KILLINGS INVOLVING NONSTRANGERS
Table 4 gives no indication of a significant deterrent effect for any of the
death penalty variables for the three categories of homicide not involving
strangers. The only suggestion of deterrence is for total nonstranger
killings. On average, the weekly count for these types of killing declined
by -.735 (s.e. = .448, t = 1.64) following the Coleman execution, but this
pattern falls just short of achieving statistical significance (t = 1.66).
Contrary to expectations and the Cochran et al. discussion, Table 4 sug
gests that the amount of media attention devoted to executions (but not
the number of executions) actually may have promoted nonstranger homi
cides as well. The levels of total nonstranger homicide are associated sig
nificantly with the number of days of news coverage of executions during
week t-1 (b = .517, s.e. = .293, t = 1.76). A similar pattern holds for non
stranger felony murders for the t-3 lagged media variable (b = .144, s.e. =
.083, t = 1.73). It simply is unclear why a possible brutalization effect for
newspaper coverage of executions might have been confined to the week
t-3 (versus week t, t-1, or t-2) media factor for these type of killings.
A FURTHER ANALYSIS
A reviewer of an earlier version of this article questioned whether the
dependence between the weekly frequency of executions and media cov
erage variables might pose a collinearity problem biasing the coefficients
for the frequency of execution variables in a negative direction. Such a
possibility could account for the mixed pattern observed for the two types
of execution variables for felony murders involving strangers (Table 3).
To explore this dependency issue, each of the models presented in
Tables 2-4 was reestimated excluding the frequency of execution variables
for weeks t through t-3. Following this procedure, the same pattern of
findings resulted for the Coleman intervention and media coverage vari
ables for all but four types of killing-capital homicides, total felony
murders, nonfelony killings involving strangers, and robbery-related kill
ings involving strangers. Because of the redundancy of the findings for the
Coleman and media variables, I present in Table 5 the regression results
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Table 4. Summary of Regression Results for Homicides
Not Involving Strangers

Predictor Variables

Total Nonstranger
Homicides
S.E.
b

Population
.005
% Age 15-34 Years
.026
Unemployment Rate
-.101
% AFDC Population
1.754
Coleman Intervention
-.735
No. of Executions
Week t
-.323
-.072
Week t-1
Week t-2
-.408
Week t-3
-.065
No. of Days of
Newspaper Coverage
Week t
.414
Week t-1
.517
Week t-2
.209
Week t-3
-.311
R2 Value
.118

Nonstranger Felony
Murders

Nonstranger
Robbery-Related
Killings

.013
.434
.226
1.791
.448

b
-.008
.179
.025
.921
-.188

S.E.
.005
.145
.098
.577
.160

b
-.006
.137
.048
.670
-.107

S.E.
.004
.123
.082
.478
.145

.318
.317
.325
.326

-.054
-.008
-.036
-.040

.094
.098
.100
.097

.035
-.017
.020
-.058

.079
.082
.084
.082

.298
.293*
.295
.284

.131
-.054
.021
.144
.142

.087
.088
.090
.083*

.043
-.048
-.034
.107
.143

.074
.074
.075
.069

* P < .05.
only for the four offenses for which there were significant departures from
the earlier (Tables 2-4) analyses.
The departures from the earlier pattern that are presented in Table 5 all
provide additional evidence of a brutalization effect for publicized execu
tions. For capital murders, again, there is a significant positive coefficient
for week (-2 media coverage, but the positive media coefficient for week (
is now also significant (b = .242, s.e. = .098, ( = 2.47). Also in contrast to
the earlier pattern, in the revised analysis the media coefficients for week (
are positive and statistically significant for both total felony murders (b =
.223, s.e. = .108, ( = 2.06) and robbery murders involving strangers (b =
.111, s.e. = .063, ( = 1.76).
Also presented in Table 5 are the findings for nonfelony murders involv
ing strangers. In the earlier analysis (Table 3), the media coefficient for
week ( was positive and statistically significant (b = .174, s.e. = .093, ( =
1.87) and the coefficient for the media factor for week (-1 was negative and
significant (b = -.173, s.e. = .094, ( = -1.84). The same mixed pattern holds
in the extended analysis. Of note, however, the positive media coefficient
for this type of killing now achieves statistical significance for week (-2
when the frequency of execution variables are excluded (b = .240, s.e. =
.070, ( = 3.42).
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Table 5. Summary of Regression Results for Selected
Types of Homicide Excluding the Frequency
of Executions as a Predictor Variable
Capital
Homicides
Predictor Variables

b

Population
-.009
% Age 15-34 Years
.004
.180
Unemployment Rate
% AFDC Population
.539
Coleman Intervention
-.345
No. of Days of
Newspaper Coverage
Week 1
.242
.063
Week t-1
Week 1-2
.187
Week 1-3
-.004
R'Value
.141

S.E.
.006
.184
.106*
.724
.223

.098*
.097
.097·
.098

Total Felony
Murders

Stranger
Nonfelony
Killings

b

S.E.

b

S.E.

-.011
.150
.061
.909
-.174

.007
.228
.138
.879
.276

-.003
.097
-.090
.025
.524

.006
.167
.102
.607
.220*

.223
.050
.108
-.045
.103

.108*
.107
.106
.107

.143
-.149
.240
.049
.153

.070*
.070·
.070·
.070

-

Stranger
Robbery-Related
Killings
b
--.002


.021
.038
-.101
208

.111
.033
.073
-.017
.102

S.E.

.004
.128
.076
.497
.165
.063*
.063
.063
.063

• P < .05.

To explore further the possible dependency between the execution fre
quency and media coverage factors, I repeated the above analysis (Tables
2-4), but now excluding the media variables. Table 6 reports the findings
for this analysis for the five offense categories for which there was a signif
icant change in the results for one or more of the weekly execution count
variables.
Like the results reported in Table 5, this extended analysis produces
additional evidence of brutalization. Now, the level of executions for
week t is associated with a significantly higher number of capital homicides
(b = .266, s.e. = .105, t = 2.53) and total robbery-related killings (b = .156,
s.e. = .089, t = 1.75). In addition, week t-1 executions are associated with a
significantly higher number of total killings (b = .443, s.e. = .267, t = 1.67),
as are week t-2 executions with felony murders not involving strangers (b
= .271, s.e. = .074, t = 3.66).
Not only does excluding the media variables add to the evidence of bru
talization for the execution frequency variables for these four types of
murder, but the suggestion of a significant deterrent effect for executions
for felony murders involving strangers is absent from Table 6. In the ear
lier analysis (Table 3), the media coefficients were negative and statisti
cally significant for week t-1 (b = -.244), s.e. = .104) and week t-2 (b = -.194,
s.e. = .106), but this is now no longer the case: b = .071, s.e. = .079 and b =
-.011, s.e. = .079, respectively. These contrasting patterns suggest a depen
dence between the frequency of execution and media coverage variables
that, at least for one offense category, artifactually produces an indication·
of a deterrent effect for executions.
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Table 6.

Summary of Regression Results for Selected
'lYpes of Homicide Excluding the Newspaper
Coverage of Executions As a Predictor
Variable

All Killings
Predictor Variables
Population
% Age 15-34 Years
Unemployment Rate
% AFDC Population
Coleman Intervention
No. of Executions
Week I
Week 1-1
Week 1-2
Week 1-3
R'Value

Capital
Homicides

b

S.E.

b

S.E.

-.007
-.029
-.053
1.481
-.370

.017
.541
.289
2.169
.637

-.007
-.129
.155
.071
-.362

.006
.187
.106
.768
.224

.266
-.014
.151
.035
.125

.105
.103
.104
.107

.137
.443
.351
-.223
.084

.275
.267'
.269
.276

Stranger
Felony
Murders

Stranger
Nonfelony
Killings

S.E.

b

S.E.

-.004
.014
-.014
.151
.103

.005
.150
.088
.607
.192

.001
-.035
-.087
-.458
.494

.005
.152
.095
.589
.191

.051
-.071
-.011
.000
.071

.079
.079
.079
.078

.052
-.033
.271
.080
.145

.074
.074
.074
.075

-b

Total
RobberyRelated
Killings

b

-.004
-.010
.024
-.082
.145
.156
-.016
.015
.061
.088

S.E.
.005
.165
.106
.695
.188
.089'
.089
.089
.090

- p < .05.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Increasingly some opponents of the death penalty contend that capital
punishment has a brutalization rather than deterrent influence on homi
cide. In developing their arguments, these analysts seldom distinguish
between types of homicide. The assumption appears to be that all types of
killing are encouraged by capital punishment. By contrast, the deterrence
doctrine emphasizes that the death penalty may be more effective in
preventing some types of killings than others; still, few deterrence investi
gators have examined empirically homicides disaggregated by type.
Rather, both deterrence and brutalization analysts tend to examine overall
rates of homicide rather than specific types of killing.
The study by Cochran et al. (1994) is an important exception. They pro
vide a rationale for why some types of murder may be deterred, while
other types are incited, by executions. However, Cochran et al. did not
take into consideration the deterrencelbrutalization importance of multi
ple dimensions of capital punishment in their attempt to isolate the effect
of Oklahoma's return to capital punishment. Importantly, Cochran et al.
regard their work as preliminary and they encourage criminologists to rep
licate and extend their study. In this study, I have done so by employing a
multivariate autoregressive analysis that incorporates additional death
penalty factors and control variables that might have had an impact on
Oklahoma killings.
Based on Cochran et al. 's arguments, I expected a brutalization effect
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for the frequency of execution and media variables for stranger, and espe
cially nonutilitarian stranger, killings, but not for the other types of homi
cide. This expectation was not borne out by the analysis. First, after
taking into consideration the sociodemographic control variables, the exe
cution frequency, and media coverage factors, the evidence persisted that
the Coleman execution was followed by a significant increase in total
stranger killings and stranger homicides not involving other felonies.
These findings parallel the results of the Cochran et al. ARIMA analysis.
Second, additional evidence of brutalization was observed from the ini
tial (Tables 2-4) and extended (Tables 5-6) analysis for the execution fre
quency and media coverage variables for (1) total killings, (2) capital
homicides, (3) total felony murder, (4) total robbery-related killings, (5)
total stranger killings, (6) stranger felony murders, (7) stranger nonfelony
killings, (8) stranger robbery-related killings, (9) total nonstranger homi
cides, and (10) nonstranger felony murders. For each of these offense cat
egories, week ( or lagged execution counts and/or media coverage of
executions was associated with a significant increase in weekly homicides.
These findings suggest that executions that occurred in other states may
have had a brutalization consequence in Oklahoma. Recall that between
1989 and 1991 only 1 of the nation's 53 executions took place in
Oklahoma.
Third, the findings regarding the deterrence hypothesis are generally in
line with previous studies. Of the 11 offense categories considered, there
is no indication that media coverage of executions discourages homicide.
There is one slight exception to this null pattern for stranger nonfelony
killings for the week (-2 lagged media variable (b = -.173, p < .05). This
pattern persists when the frequency of execution variables are excluded
from the analysis (b = -.149, s.e. = .070, ( = -2.13). I have no explanation
for this quirky result. However, it is noteworthy that for the same offense
for the initial analysis (Table 3), the significant coefficient for the week (
media factor (b = .174, P < .05) is almost identical in size, but opposite in
direction. When the week ( (brutalization) and week (-1 (deterrence)
effects of media coverage are summed, the net result is essentially a zero
media effect for stranger nonfelony killings. The pattern is quite similar
for the media variables for week ((b = .143) and week (-1 (b = -.149) in the
extended analysis in which the frequency of execution variables are
excluded from the models (Table 5). Of further interest, in this extended
analysis the media coefficient for week (-2 is positive and statistically sig
nificant (b = .240, s.e. = .070, ( = 3.43).
The only suggestion of a possible deterrent effect for capital punishment
is for the frequency of execution variables for felony murders involving
strangers. The initial analysis (Table 3) showed that higher levels of execu
tion during week (-1 and week (-2 were associated with a significantly
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lower number of stranger felony murders (b = -.224 and b = -.194, respec
tively). However, even for these types of killing, definitive conclusions
cannot be drawn. Recall (see Table 3) that the results for the week t-1 and
week t-2 media variables were also significant for felony murders involving
strangers, but in the opposite direction, thus suggesting a brutalization
effect. These contrasting patterns are puzzling. Why would a higher
number of executions discourage (deter) felony murders involving stran
gers, while higher levels of media coverage of executions promote (brutali
zation) these types of murder? The extended analysis presented in Table 6
may provide an answer to this question. As detailed above, when the exe
cution media variables are excluded from the analysis, there is only a weak
negative, and chance only, relationship between stranger felony murders
and the frequency of executions for weeks t-1 and t-2. This pattern ques
tions the possibility of a genuine (and not just apparent) significant rela
tionship between felony murders involving strangers in Oklahoma and the
level of weekly executions in the United States during the 1989-1991
period.
Finally, it should be noted that the goodness of fit of the models
presented in Tables 2-6 is rather poor. The multiple R2 values range from
.110 to .166. To a certain degree the poor fit may be due to important
structural factors not being included in the analysis. However, a more
likely explanation is that weekly homicide time series are subject to con
siderable noise and are by their nature not very stable. As temporal units
of analysis become longer (such as with months, quarters, or years), homi
cide trends become more stable, and multivariate analyses typically pro
duce better fits. To illustrate, from a monthly time-series analysis of
execution pUblicity and the overall homicide rate in Georgia (1950-1965,
n = 192 months), Stack (1993) reports an R2 value of only .19. When years
rather than weeks or months are considered in time series, R2 values are
commonly in the .60 to .80 range.
In short, the relatively low R2 values associated with the above models
are not a major concern. For this type of analysis, weeks are simply noise
units. However, weeks are important units to consider if the deterrence/
brutalization effects of capital punishment are rather immediate and short
lived.
In conclusion, this replication and extension of the Cochran et al. analy
sis demonstrates that it is a mistake for criminologists to treat the deter
rence/brutalization question as a dead issue. It is equally a mistake for
death penalty investigators to be content with "testing" deterrence/brutali
zation arguments by simply examining general homicides. Rather,
detailed combinations of homicide circumstances and victim-offender rela
tionships must be considered, as well as the possibility that the deterrent/

732
brutalization impact of capital punishment may differ for different dimen
sions of capital punishment.
I recommend that the next round of deterrencelbrutalization research
extend this analysis by considering additional and more diverse jurisdic
tions, and more extended time periods. Besides Oklahoma, a number of
other states have returned to capital punishment in the past few years after
long nonexecution periods (California, Illinois, Delaware, Washington,
Wyoming). In addition, a number of jurisdictions that have not conducted
an execution for decades have large death row populations (Ohio, Penn
sylvania, Kentucky, Tennessee, New Jersey, Maryland). The former and
latter jurisdictions (when executions resume) can be examined as addi
tional natural quasi-experiments (Campbell, 1969) to both clarify and
determine the generalizability of the findings for Oklahoma.
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